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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

La Psychologie, ses divers objets et ses méthodes. ANDRÉ LALANDE. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 3, 4, pp. 177–221.

The independent status which seemed assured to psychology during the period between 1881–1903 has been threatened by two great influences: (1) analysis has revealed the importance of intuition and immediate feelings. Bergson identifies human and even comparative psychology with metaphysics, and James, though at first a partisan of a strictly 'scientific' psychology, in 1907, greatly modified this earlier point of view; (2) by the influence of sociology, especially the works and teaching of Durkheim, who declares that social life depends upon psychical processes that are inseparable from judgments of value or philosophic problems in general. But what we really call psychology consists of several types of research, distinct both in aim and method. (1) Psychology, undertaken as a study of physiological behaviorism, regards the conduct of all living creatures as explained by an immense number of definite, delicate and varied reflexes which are displaced, associated, facilitated or inhibited during the course of 'experience.' From this standpoint, the modification of these reflexes is regarded as the sole problem of psychology, the method being capable of a varied and extended application in the field of education and in all sorts of acquired associations. (2) Another type of psychology deals with consciousness, its desires, pains and fatigues. It also examines the conscious idea of the presence of others—of their feelings and intentions which play an important rôle in mental life and attitude. Furthermore, it should examine questions of fact in the consideration of moral value. (3) Still another type of psychology would consist in the investigation of the elements of experience in their relation to a subject or thinking person, and in certain cases to thought in general. The distinction between the actual psychological process, such as pain, and the idea which the process provokes in consciousness, reflective psychology, involves this third type of research, and necessitates an analysis of the general conditions of consciousness. Thinking implies certain forms of affirmation, negation, identity, difference, time, space, order, number and necessity of which the relations and precise significance must be determined. This type of psychology does not apply to things but to the act by which things are thought. (4) Finally, an ontological or metaphysical psychology would concern itself with a general view of the relations of man and nature. For since no one knows where metaphysics begins and positive science ends, to proscribe metaphysic would be arresting an investigation which may prove both interesting and fruitful psychologically.

As regards psychological methods, we find first of all, that though the introspective method involves many difficulties, it is quite legitimate. It consists in determining the nature of psychical processes through the description which the subject gives under controlled conditions, instead of merely attending to the physical response or reaction that he manifests. Thus in comparing two weights, we do not care to determine the exact quantitative relation of the comparison so much as the attitude of mind under which the observer made the comparison. Binet declares that introspection has revealed an indefinite number of states of consciousnesses: consciousness of relations, intellectual feelings, mental attitudes, tendencies, etc. By way of introduction to pathological and psycho-analytic methods, the author declares that mental pathology for fifteen years has been the principal factor involved in the progress of psychology. It is the point of view which has determined the distinct stages of psychological life and the rôle played by images, ideas, emotions, and tendencies in the constitution of the personality. Above all, in establishing certain distinct types of insanity, it has greatly contributed to the comprehending and bringing together of many facts of normal general psychology. Dr. Freud, while still employing the psycho-analytic method of questioning in pathological cases, has renounced hypnosis as a means of procedure and confines himself to asking questions habitually attitudinized by the patients; by observing the remarks, intonations, attitudes and involuntary gestures which the patient assumes in replying to questions while in a natural and unaffected frame of mind; by an analysis of dreams which Freud considers to be the true revealers of intense desires, habitually repressed as undesirable or revolting. But this method of interrogation and observation, oriented by a search for repressed 'complexes,' is very much exposed to the dangers of suggestion. The cures which it effects are often explicable by far simpler psychological phenomena than those generally named by Freud. An attempt at interpretation, however, is a step which has great value in the endeavor to discover the real significance of images and in the establishment of a general system of normal and pathological psychology. Another guiding principle for scientific analysis is the observation of the development and normal evolution of the human mind whose various stages appear to be homogeneously grouped or related: by observing the phenomenal progress of the infant; by examining the successive transformations of consciousness historically; or finally, by analyzing the actual peoples found in different degrees of civilization, assuming that the most simple type of savagery represents the oldest and most primitive form of racial psychology. These genetic methods propose to explain mental functions by their genesis rather than by describing the actual relations present at any particular moment. This method has certainly given rise to very novel as well as suggestive concepts, but the greatest precautions are necessary if we wish to escape illusions. It generally involves the assumption of a simple and uniform primitive state of mind common to all races. But the facts do not give any support to this hypothesis, and appear to modify it in many respects. What we almost always meet with in the oldest forms of a religion or language is a multiplicity of forms which progress or evolve either by elimination or assimilation. Another illusion is that the present mental state of a non-civilized people can furnish us *a priori* with an irrefragable representation of its past mental attitude. It is also very dangerous in genetic psychology to reconstitute a series of hypothetical stages whose order is not directly known and furnished by chronological determinations. Reality when properly observed almost never presents this regular series. The celebrated formula that ontogenesis is a reproduction of phylogenesis cannot be admitted; the action of heredity and environment entirely changes the conditions of the phenomena. The psycho-physical method, involving the concepts of an absolute and differential limen of sensation, proportional to the stimulus, consists in varying the stimulus to discover the difference limen for any given series of sensations. The four principal methods employed are the method of just noticeable differences, the method of gradation, the method of true and false cases and the method of mean errors. The results obtained are criticized because the numerical units so furnished cannot be interpolated by a simple formula and also on the ground that sensation does not satisfy the general conditions of measurable magnitudes. It is also noticeable that nothing guarantees the equality of just noticeable differences of sensation, for that is to confound a numerical series with a series of increasing values of a given variable.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Claude Bernard et l'esprit expérimental. R. LENOIR. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 1–2, pp. 72–101.

Claude Bernard freed physiology from metaphysics and vitalism. By his discoveries and by the invention of a new technique he helped forward the method of experimentation, and showed that without the experimental spirit experiment is nothing. His conception of science sprang from an historical, psychological method analogous to the positive method of Comte. He raised empiricism to experimental rationalism by showing that experience only acquires its full sense when logic is introduced into the study of facts to establish the relations between them. The formal conditions which assure the validity of phenomena are furnished by reason. The assumption of the uniformity of natural law is such a rational presupposition, for upon it all prediction and action upon phenomena depend. Science rests on the principle of determinism. Bernard thought that besides the facts of experience and reason, there is a directive, creative idea, which he called sentiment or intuition. This is the essence of the scientific spirit. It is unlike other intuitions n that here imagination and belief are separated. The intuition of the scientist is a state of doubt, of suspended judgment; it involves faith in science and distrust of self. Bernard means nothing mysterious by this intuition; he has simply described the psychological attitude of scientific thought. Also when he describes himself as a vitalist, Bernard does not mean the old vitalism or neo-vitalism. He does not conceive vital action to be something in its essence which escapes science. A vital mechanism is only a mechanism of a *particular sort.* In uniting physiological elements, properties appear which were not appreciable in the separate elements. We call vital those properties of the organism not yet reduced to physico-chemical terms. Though the 'vital synthesis' has not yet been solved by science, it will be some day. The mechanism of the organism must be studied in the living, and not by a procedure which destroys the phenomenon before explaining it. Bernard freed biology from metaphysical theorizing by narrowing it to the study of the physico-chemical conditions of life. He made clear the sense in which science can admit the uniqueness of vital phenomena without falling into a vitalism that relinquishes the principle of determinism. He recognized the autonomy of the anatomical elements to be an essential postulate of physiology. The solution of the problems of vital phenomena is to be looked for in the anatomical element and in the living cell. The present epoch seems absorbed in the individual, the particular. Bernard has apparently asserted in vain that experience deprived of its intellectual elements is nothing but empiricism.

MARIE T. COLLINS.

Causality, Induction, and Probability. P. E. B. JOURDAIN. Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 162–180.

Mach has shown that the concept of cause can be replaced by the mathematical concept of function, that the law of causality is an *a priori* postulate of science. In a previous work Jourdain has tried to show that causality is a problem of extrapolation which depends on the nature of the functions assumed, and has no reference to the notion of probability. In his *Principles of Mathematics*, Russell has supported the view that the foundations of physics are concerned with the determination of the nature of certain functions so as to make possible the validity of the law of causality. In his later works, however, he emphasizes the "inductive principle" as a foundation for the law of causality, implying that Jourdain does not go to the root of the matter. But the law of causality is an *a priori* principle which is more fundamental than induction and mere probability. The notion of causality appears in the notion of probability, and therefore cannot be defined in terms of probability. There may not be any principle of causality, but if such does exist it must be *a priori*. It is impossible to determine a law from a finite number of observations.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

The Syllogism and Other Logical Forms. H. S. SHELTON. Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 180–203.

The aim of this essay is to offer "a methodological description of the process of formal reasoning as applied to material reality." Deduction involves three processes. First, there is the abstracting from reality the concepts of the aspect with which we are dealing. A deduction is valid only with regard to the concept used. Secondly, there is the reasoning with regard to these concepts by means of some universal rule. We make a deduction only because, consciously or unconsciously, we consider some principle to be absolutely or universally true. Thirdly, the conclusion is referred back to reality. The conclusion is materially true only after having been referred back and empirically verified. The syllogism should be accepted as the standard mode of formal logic. Only that which is formally stated can have any place in logic, and all arguments *can* be expressed syllogistically. Some subsidiary forms are developed from the syllogism. All deductive reasoning is and must be formal. Formal deductive logic should be disentangled from the psychological and metaphysical discussions with which it has been associated.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Logic As the Science of the Pure Concept. G. A. TAWNEY, J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 7, pp. 169–180.

The article offers a critical exposition of Croce's *Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept.* In this work the pure concept and perception, philosophy and history are identified. The *Ding an sich* and the transcendental ego are rejected. The following equation is introduced: Philosophy = thought = history = perception of reality. Every philosophy must be at basis idealism. But Croce is not an idealist in the Platonic sense. His reality is that of perception. No hypothesis can be philosophical that is not thinkable as an idea. Philosophy is the doctrine of the categories. So far as the truths of science, industry, commerce, and morality are concerned, his doctrine is pragmatic. The task of the empirical sciences is classification, and that is dominated by practical motives. The law of thought proceeds on the principle of identity and contradiction: A is A *and* A is not-B. His theory of knowledge reduces itself to the following: "There are two pure theoretic forms, the intuition and the concept, the second of which is subdivided into judgment of definition and individual judgment, and there are two modes of practical elaboration of knowledge, or of formation of pseudo-concepts, the empirical concept and the abstract concept, from which are derived the two subforms of judgment of classification and judgment of enumeration." Error, he believes, is the substitution of the practical act of the spirit for a theoretical act, the uttering of sounds to which there corresponds no thought. It might be successful and rational, but cannot be morally good. Error is an improper combination of ideas.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Critique de Moi-Même. BENEDETTO CROCE. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 1, pp. 1–40.

It is not Croce's purpose in this small essay to write confessions or recollections or memoirs. This is a critique of himself, wherein he sets forth briefly the story of his studies and contributions to human learning.

As a child, he had a great love for all sorts of tales. His greatest enjoyment lay in the reading of books; and in this he was helped by his mother. At nine he entered a Catholic college. The moral and religious education there was free from superstition and fanaticism. So far he knew nothing about politics. Soon after, he came to dislike all party politics, rhetoric, and oratory. His chief interest was in literature and history. He suffered greatly from waves of desire for the ascetic and deeply religious life. But this did not hinder his studies. In his classes he was always among the first. During the last years at this college the director gave some lectures on the philosophy of religion. As a result of these lectures young Croce was thrown into a religious crisis, and came out freed from religious beliefs. About the same time his reading bore fruit. He was inspired to write some critical essays, which appeared in a literary journal in 1882. He later revised these and published them in pamphlet form under the title, *The First Step.*

Then came the earthquake of Casamicciola, which robbed him of his parents and only sister. He was himself hurt under the ruins. When he recovered from the bruises, he went, together with his brother, into the home of Silvio Spaventa, who became their guardian. This led him into political surroundings. Being totally ignorant of politics, his life became exceedingly miserable. His delicate constitution grew even more frail. These were his most sorrowful years. Nor did his study of law at the University make his existence any happier. He left without even taking the examinations, having all this while preferred poring over books in the libraries to attending to his texts. He became interested in the moral philosophy of Antonio Labriola, and many of the ideas of that book he later incorporated in his *Philosophy of the Practical.* His studies in Labriola were followed by a period of pessimism. He wrote much, and published his pamphlet entitled *Juvenilia.*

It was in 1886 that he returned to Naples. Here he was much happier. He determined to devote his life to scholarly research. He began to see the philosophical aspect of things. He read the German philosophers, but could not understand them, and was discouraged. For six years he turned all of his attention to study, and it was during these years that he wrote most of his essays later published in his *Neapolitan Revolution of 1799.* He also wrote *Playhouses of Naples from the Renaissance to the End of the Eighteenth Century,* some of the essays comprising *The Literature of the Eighteenth Century,* and other essays which formed a series of *Historical Curiosities.* He also began the publication of a *Neapolitan Literary Library,* and, with some friends, the

Napoli Nobilissima. The value of these works toward his own growth was twofold. First, his childish dreams of literature and research were satisfied, and he was forced into strong mental and physical discipline. But the chief value of these works was a negative one. Just when he was hailed by critics as a creator of *la bonne littérature italienne,* he became averse to this *bonne littérature.* The publication of these works made him feel as if he had closed a period of his life. Henceforth he wanted to be concerned only with the deeper, more serious aspects of life. But what were the deeper aspects of life? He was not sure. At any rate he determined to make a study of the sentiments and spiritual life of the Italian people from the Renaissance to the present day. This necessitated a knowledge of the peoples which influenced Italy. It was not long before he was making researches into the nature of history and science. He became interested in the problem of art. After long meditation he wrote his *History Embraced under the General Concept of Art.* This completed, he returned to his historical studies proper. He plunged into and mastered political economy. This bore fruit in a volume of essays: *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx.* Then he turned to art, on which he had long desired to write. He had published the *Fundamental Theses of an Esthetic As a Science of Expression and General Linguistics.* These labors on art culminated in the *Esthetic,* which appeared in 1902. But the *Esthetic* raised numerous other problems to which he now devoted his attention.

In 1900 he had come in close relationship with Gentile. With the aid of the latter Croce founded in 1903 *La Critica,* a magazine devoted to a review of history, literature, and philosophy. This marks the period of his maturity in thought,—the union of the theoretical with the practical. He believes that it is in directing and contributing to *La Critica* that he rendered the greatest service to Italian culture. At the same time Croce did not neglect his studies. Beside publishing collections of Italian works, he succeeded in publishing in 1905 his first sketch of the *Logic.* In 1906, he published *What Is Living and What Is Dead of the Philosophy of Hegel;* in 1907, the *Philosophy of Right As Economic;* in 1908, the *Philosophy of the Practical;* in 1909, the *Logic* under a developed form; in 1910, the *Problems of Esthetics;* in 1911, a monograph on *Vice;* in 1912, the *Theory of Historiography;* in 1913, the *Breviary of Esthetics.* Beside these, he completed *The Italian Historiography from the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century Until To-day,* and numerous smaller monographs.

The last twelve years have been the most fruitful. He solved his difficulties, and achieved internal serenity. It is the period when he learned most and created most. From *De Sanctis* he learned that art is not a work of reflection or logic, or a product of skill; but that in its spontaneity and purity, it is a form of the imagination. In his early years his philosophy came to take on a sort of Platonic-Scholastic Herbartianism. That served as a protection against the Naturalism and Materialism which dominated the days of his youth, and rendered him immune from the sensualism which was coming into style under the leadership of D'Annunzio. But he was not influenced by

D'Annunzio. Nor was he influenced by the Hegelian, Spaventa. While Spaventa was interested almost wholly in the theological-philosophical problems of the relation between Being and Knowing, transcendence and immanence, Croce was moved to philosophy by his interest in the problems of art, the moral life, of right, and later, the historical method. Spaventa could not have influenced him because their minds are of totally different types. D'Annunzio could not have influenced him because he is a contemporary of Croce.

Age has brought with it maturity of thought and calmness of spirit. The perplexing problems and dissatisfied solutions of his earlier life have ended in satisfactory solutions, a faith in himself and in the ability of man in attaining truth. The reception which his works have received all over the world have brought him contentment and peace.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

Esthétique et Memoire. EUGENE D'EICHTHAL. Rev. Ph., XLIV, 2, 3, pp. 222–250.

The source of beauty is in our sensation of physical well-being, while the memory which, like all organic functions, must exercise, rest, conserve and develop itself, transforms these sensations of well-being into rudimentary æsthetic appreciation. The affirmation of the existence of rhythms and various symmetrical forms is itself the proof of the functioning of the memory in æsthetic. The waves of the sea, the march or gallop of certain animals and the beating of the wings of certain birds furnish examples of natural rhythms. The memory which recalls the multifarious organic forms of æsthetic expression is the faculty of relating the impressions of our sense organs to past impressions. It also plays an associational rôle by attaching to the sensorial perception all sorts of ideas and images. The memory is thus the consummation in time and space of a unity of elements which concur by means of the relations involved to give us a completely satisfying impression of the *ensemble* present to sense-perception. This consummation gives birth to a feeling of satisfaction which constitutes an æsthetic realization. Beauty presupposes certitude attested by the memory and is thus understood by the finest artists and critics. A thing is beautiful because of its characteristic of perfection, and so little by little moral considerations are related to the appreciation of beauty. For beauty seems incomplete when not associated with majesty or gravity or perhaps with a certain passion or moral disquietude. The appreciation of a work of beauty is not possible without a preliminary training of the memory which reunites and solidifies the elements and organizes them into a unity. Observations indicate that the memory does not exercise itself with the same rapidity, the same application or the same specialization in all mankind. There are singular inequalities in the power of æsthetic appreciation in various individuals. Some do not appear to know how to use their eyes and ears in constructing or discovering a source of harmony or beauty. Others appear to have this faculty of æsthetic memory innately developed, and also creating in others the taste for art which they themselves have felt. The current of sympathy between creative work in art and its public appreciation is very often a great source of pleasure for both, depending on the one hand on the love of admiration and fame, and on the pleasure of the æsthetic feeling on the other. Memory, which is one of the principal causes for the permanency of the rules that regulate art, is fundamentally necessary to an appreciation of an æsthetic object.

EDGAR DE LASKI.

Ernest Renan et la Philosophie Contemporaine. D. PARODI. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 1, pp. 41–66.

Renan's superb literary talent has been injurious to his importance as a philosopher. In his views he seems to stand between Comte and Bergson. In *The Future of Science* he speaks as a positivist. His faith in science is immeasurable. This faith he never lost. In 1890 he wrote: "I was therefore right at the beginning of my intellectual career in believing firmly in science and in taking it for the goal of my life. If I were to begin over I would do the same thing again." But he attributes to science a religious function. Science has a religious value because its conception of life is serious. The spirit of atheism is a frivolous one. Science is the true modern religion. Renan really introduces the romantic German philosophy into French science. His standpoint is distinctly historical. In *The Origin of Language* he holds that languages do not come from a common root, as had been supposed, and the further back one goes the more diversity one finds. Like Comte, he too has three laws of progress. Syncretism, or the first view of things, is comprehensive, but obscure and inexact. This is followed by analysis, or the state of precise distinctions and discussions. But as yet we have no unity. That is produced by synthesis, which unites the power of the intuition with scientific clearness. The first state is religious; the intermediate state is irreligious but scientific; while the last state is both religious and scientific. Truth is continuous progress. The results of the moral sciences reduce themselves to history. Our time is historical, not metaphysical. All sciences are at bottom only diverse forms of history. Nothing is static in nature; everything is in perpetual development. The very laws of nature apply only to the actual state of things. The universe has an ideal goal, which is that reason should rule. The term God is used in two senses; as the category of the ideal; and as synonymous with the whole of existence. The divine is revealed in us not only through religion and science, but also by art and morality. The end of humanity is intellectual and moral perfection.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

A Sketch of the Philosophy of Religion, with Illustrations of Critical Monism. DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH. Mind, N. S., XXVIII, 110, pp. 129–162.

Neither idealistic monism, rationalistic monism, nor epistemological dualism can stand the test of experience. What is needed is a critical monism, *i. e.*, a philosophy which seeks to be monistic while at the same time it remains critical and takes account of experienced fact. This may be applied to religion. The final test of religion is its intellectual value. Here God, as a dependable Power discovered through a religious attitude, is of direct acquaintance to the religious man. Truth is attained when the predicate is practically identical with the subject matter about which the judgment is made. The empirical results of empirical science should be synthesized, and theology included. Thus metaphysics and theology become necessary to each other. The method of critical monism is to be applied to the problems of matter and mind, law and freedom, evolution and creation, mechanism and purpose, nature and the supernatural, the one and the many, and good and evil.

ISRAEL CHASMAN.

"Scientific Prepossession" and Antiscientific Animus. KNIGHT DUNLAP. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 6, pp. 156–160.

The feature which Professor Fite finds most objectionable in psychology is its demand for scientific proof, as against conjecture, popular report, and anecdote. All the apostles of the Easy Way protest that it is silly to insist on scientific demonstration of the phenomena, which they declare they have observed by merely "keeping the eyes of the mind open." Scientific method does not accept a mere statement of what is believed to have happened; it demands an arrangement of the conditions under which it happened, and also requires a statement of conditions under which it may be repeated. The practical accomplishments of psychologists through scientific methods in the various branches of the army and navy, will be found in their reports. Psychology deals with the mind, and with the physical and psychological phenomena which are closely connected with the mind. So psychological research finds its work not so much in extending the field of human knowledge, as in bringing order out of chaos within its field. Psychology will always be dull to those who have not the 'scientific prepossession,'—the prepossession that no labor is too hard if it lends to the ascertainment of truth.

EMILY A. LANE.

Prediction and Spontaneity. A. A. MERRILL. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., XVI, 6, pp. 161–162.

The two functions of the intellect are 'to describe' and 'to reason.' The difference between the two is that the former relates to that which we have experienced, while the latter means to go from that which we have experienced to that which we have not experienced. We describe the past and predict the future. Since prediction involves the passing of time, this passing of time must not introduce any cause not known at the time of prediction; otherwise the effect cannot be predicted because all the causes are not known. A spontaneous act is an act, all of the causes of which do not come into existence until the very instant of the act. Clearly such an act cannot be predicted. To predict one must know all the causes. And if we did this we could not predict the act, we could only describe it, because it would then belong to the past. Prediction is most accurate in the sciences of logic, mathematics, astronomy and physics; and is least accurate in biology, political economy, sociology and history. In the latter sciences, which deal with the living, spontaneity is bound to enter and spoil predictions, because the time between a prediction and the phenomenon predicted cannot be ignored without destroying the accuracy of the prediction. EMILY A. LANE.

La "Pédagogie" de Rousseau. É. DURKHEIM. Rev. de Mét., XXVI, 2, pp. 153–180.

The educator, Rousseau says, must take nature as a guide. The reasons are that the child is man in the state of nature and that nature furnishes a norm that is not arbitrary but may be observed and studied. Thus if pedagogy adopts such a standard, it becomes less subjective. Although Rousseau believes that a child is intrinsically good, he does not on that account adopt a *laissez faire* pedagogical doctrine. Indeed, no one has felt more keenly than he the necessity for education, nor has anyone had a more exalted opinion of what might be accomplished by it in transforming the nature of the child and putting him in harmony with his environment. To bring about this adjustment the educator should seek to establish equilibrium between the child's desires and his capabilities. Education must, therefore, become a science and a study of the nature of the child. This psychological emphasis of Rousseau's pedagogy is an important innovation. Nature teaches us two main things concerning education: the fundamental needs of the child can be satisfied only by being allowed to develop freely; yet man is a civil being and, as such, must feel the yoke of necessity. The feeling of restraint should be imposed, not by education, but by physical things. Commands cannot properly give this feeling of necessity, for they represent the demand that a certain act be performed, not because of its necessity, but because it has been commanded. The child will accept a restraint that results from the physical nature of things. He should not be punished but should feel the physical consequences of his acts. It follows from all this that a child should live in an environment of things. The master should impose his will on the child through the manipulation of things, but this manipulation must be according to law. A direct relation between master and pupil is, however, sometimes inevitable, but even then the manifestation of the master's will should have the character of a manifestation of nature. This educational doctrine has been characterized by Rousseau as negative because it excludes man and society. It limits the nature of the child by things only during the first twelve years, which is the most important period in life; the young child can best be influenced through physical objects, for they will arouse his imagination and serve as instruments of culture. Yet the child cannot avoid contact with man and hence there must be some ethical instruction. This should be given through the medium of the forces which play on life and not through precept. The child should be taught his rights and duties by being instructed at first concerning what is originally implied in the right of property. Then he can be led to respect the rights of others and thus will come to respect the social bond.

MARJORIE S. HARRIS.